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TERRORISTS, INTERROGATION, AND TORTURE:
WHERE DO WE DRAW THE LINE?
Elizabeth S. Silker*
INTRODUCTION
In the past, the United States handled terrorist attacks under the criminal law
system. However, traditional methods of law enforcement may not succeed in
preventing post-September 11 terrorist attacks, and the current United States criminal
law system no longer provides an adequate framework for the problem of terrorism.
This Note focuses on the interrogation of alleged terrorists and specifically whether
torture, or any degree of pressure, is ever defensible. In a situation where an
interrogator is questioning an individual known to have information about an imminent
terrorist attack on the United States, physical or psychological pressure may be the
interrogator's last resort.
While the Supreme Court has not considered a case in this context, it has held that
the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause I is not violated until the statements at
issue are introduced against the defendant in a criminal trial.2 When law enforcement
agents interrogate a terrorist in order to prevent a devastating attack, criminal
prosecution is a distant second to the priority of saving innocent lives. In addition, the
Court may distinguish this situation from its past holdings by taking into account the
preventative purpose of the interrogation and the national security issues at stake.
The Court may decline to approach preventative terrorist interrogation cases
differently. If so, an interrogator who chooses to subject the terrorist to some degree of
torture so as to elicit the necessary information ought to raise the necessity defense in
order to avoid criminal liability. In this situation, torture is not right or just, but the
judge or jury can decide whether it is the lesser of the two evils.
Although some degree of torture may be necessary to prevent an imminent terrorist
attack, we must be careful to confine its use to this limited circumstance. All human
beings should be treated with dignity and respect, and at its core the War on Terror is
being fought to secure these values for all people.
Part I of this Note analyzes terrorism, how it is changing, and why it is necessary
for the United States to treat terrorism differently from other criminal activity after the
attacks of September 11. Part II attempts to define the concept of torture. Part III
outlines the United States' policy regarding torture, and Part IV of the Note examines
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2005; B.A., University of Notre Dame, 2002. The author
would like to thank Professor G. Robert Blakey for his helpful insights on the topic. She would like to thank
her parents and husband for their support and encouragement.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003) (discussed infra at Part V.A.).
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three other perspectives on torture. Specifically, Part IV looks at the prohibition of
torture imposed by international human rights laws, critiques the argument that torture
is defensible in some situations if advance judicial approval is obtained, and examines
the Israeli system's experience with forceful interrogation techniques. Part V discusses
the existing legal framework that might be applied to cases involving the torture of
terrorists. Finally, this Note concludes that the necessity defense should be available to
a law enforcement official who subjects a terrorist to some degree of torture in order to
prevent harm to innocent people.
I. THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM
A. What is Terrorism?
The term "terrorism" first referred to the reign of terror that occurred during the
French Revolution, when the government executed political opponents, seized their
property, and imposed terror over the remainder of the population until they succumbed
to its rule.3  While no uniform definitions of terrorism or terrorist exist, many
definitions have a common foundation: "terrorism is the use of violence or the
imposition of fear to achieve a particular purpose.... *A The Oxford English Dictionary
defines both terrorist and terrorism broadly: a terrorist is defined as "[a]ny one who
attempts to further his views by a system of coercive intimidation," and terrorism is
defined as "[a] policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted;
the employment of methods of intimidation." 5 Section 14(1) of the English Prevention
of Terrorism (Temporary Provision) Act, 1984, and Section 20(1) of the English
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provision) Act, 1989, explicitly define terrorism:
"Terrorism means the use of violence for political ends and includes any use of violence
for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear."
6
Terrorism has also been defined by describing the characteristics and motives of
terrorists:
Terrorism is the crassest antithesis to democracy. It is the attempt to subjugate and
pervert the will of the people and its elected leadership by a minute bunch of reckless
people resorting to terrifying threats and unbridled violence. They say they kill for
the cause. What is that cause? Liberty from oppression? Freedom from want?
Justice for people? If that would be their cause, how could they plot the
extermination of another people, terrorize their own kinsmen and stuff their war
3. See Emmanuel Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism: The Balance Between the Right of a
Democracy to Defend Itself and the Protection of Human Rights, 6 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 89, 97
(2001).
4. Id.
5. XVII OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 821 (2d ed. 1989).
6. Gross, supra note 3, at 98.
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chests with oil money from Saudi Arabia, to finance the assault against the regimes
of these countries? Their cause is killing. Their vocation is violence.
7
In the past, "the persons forming the group [were] organize[d] in a tightly
controlled structure;" 8 however, this may not be true of terrorist groups such as Al
Qaeda. Today's terrorism is worldwide. Terrorist organizations share intelligence
information and fighting tactics, enjoy the support of states such as Iran, and thus can
organize quickly. Terrorism draws its power from both political and religious sources,
and terrorist violence is often a symbol for other issues.
9
B. Laws Reflect the Changing Nature of Terrorism
In July 1992, the Egyptian Parliament passed several antiterrorism amendments to
their penal code. 10 The amendments broaden the definition of terrorism to include
"spreading panic" and obstructing the work of authorities. 1  They also allow police to
hold suspects for twenty-four hours before obtaining arrest warrants and impose life
imprisonment or the death penalty for membership in a terrorist organization.
12
Section 411(c) of the USA PATRIOT Act 13 amended the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 14 to set forth criteria for designating an
organization as a "foreign terrorist organization."' 15 The AEDPA gives the Secretary of
State the power "to block all financial transactions involving the assets of foreign
terrorist organizations in the United States, to prevent people from providing material
support to foreign terrorist organizations, and to prohibit representatives of foreign
terrorist organizations from entering the United States." 16 The Secretary of State, along
with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, can designate a group as a
foreign terrorist organization if the group meets three statutorily-defined criteria: (1) the
group must be a "foreign" organization; (2) the group must "engage[] in terrorist
activity"; and (3) the group's terrorist activity or terrorism must "threaten[] the security
of United States nationals or the national security of the United States."
17
The statute does not define the term "foreign organization," but there is some
evidence that the term may be narrowly construed. 18 However, in responding to more
7. Id. at 100-01 (citing Gideon Rafael, Chairman's Opening Remarks, Third Session of Jerusalem
Conference on International Terrorism (July 3, 1999), in INT'L TERRORISM: CHALLENGE & RESPONSE 111-12
(Benjamin Netanyahu ed., 1980)).
8. Gross, supra note 3, at 97.
9. Id.
10. Scott Kent Brown II, Note & Comment, The Coptic Church in Egypt: A Comment on Protecting
Religious Minorities from Nonstate Discrimination, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1049, 1070 n. 154 (2000).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 411(c), 115 Stat. 272, 349 (2001).
14. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004).
15. Joshua A. Ellis, Note, Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations Under the AEDPA: The
National Council Court Erred in Requiring Pre-Designation Process, 2002 BYU L. REv. 675, 677 (2002).
16. Id. at 675.
17. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(1)(A)-(C) (West 2001).
18. See Ellis, supra note 15, at 678-79. In October 1999, Secretary of State Madeline Albright
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recent terrorist threats and attacks against the United States, the government may
include a domestic organization under this designation if it is controlled by or affiliated
with a foreign terrorist organization.
The AEDPA defines terrorist activity broadly to include
unlawful activity which involves the 'hijacking or sabotage of any conveyance,'
hostage taking, an attack or assassination, or the use of weapons or dangerous devices
with the requisite intent, including biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, the definition of terrorist activity includes any threat, attempt, or
conspiracy to engage in any of [these] activities.... 19
An organization participates in terrorist activity when it commits, induces, or provokes
another to commit a terrorist activity, when it prepares or plans such activity, when it
"gather[s] information on potential targets for terrorist activity," when it solicits
individuals to engage in such activity or become a member of such organization, or
when it solicits funds for such organizations or activities.
20
AEDPA's third requirement for designation as a foreign terrorist organization is
that the terrorism in which the organization engages must threaten the national security
of the United States.2 1 The statute defines national security as "national defense,
foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States. ' 2 2 This criterion is not
limited to domestic national security; threats to United States nationals or United States
interests abroad can also support the designation as a foreign terrorist organization.
23
C. The United States Should Treat Terrorism Differently than Crime
In the past, terrorism was often treated the same way as every other criminal
offense. However, whether we create new rules or interpret old rules in a new way to
deal with terrorism, we must distinguish between terrorist offenses and regular criminal
offenses. Otherwise, unique measures designed for terrorist offenses may be applied to
regular criminal offenses. A distinction must be drawn between rules that apply to
terrorist offenses and those that apply to criminal offenses.
24
However we deal with terrorism, we must not lose sight of the three essential
qualities of a liberal democratic regime. First, there must be a responsible government;
second, the rule of law must prevail; and third, no prohibition may be imposed on
redesignated the Mujahedin-e Khalq ("PMOI") as a foreign terrorist organization. She also designated the
National Council of Resistance of Iran ("NCRI") an alias of PMOI, and thus included NCRI in the scope of
PMOI's designation as a foreign terrorist organization. The U.S. representative office of NCRI ("NCRIUS"),
together with NCRI and PMOI, challenged the designation. NCRIUS argued that since it was a domestic non-
profit corporation organized under the laws of the District of Columbia, it was not a "foreign organization"
and could not be designated as a foreign terrorist organization under the AEDPA. The U.S. government
responded by agreeing that NCRIUS was not included in the designation. Id. at 679.
19. Id. at 680-81.
20. Id. at 681 (quoting 8 U.S.C.A. 182(3)(B)(iv)(I)-(V) (West Supp. 2004)).
21. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189(a)(1)(C) (West Supp. 2004).
22. Id. § 1189(c)(2).
23. See Ellis, supra note 5, at 682.
24. See Gross, supra note 3, at 98-100.
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legitimate political opposition to the regime.25 Thus, not all opposition to the existing
government will fall within the definition of terrorist activity, and the distinction must
be clear. In addition, we must remember that democracy is maintained not only by the
preservation of rights and liberties, but also by the preservation of security.
In the past, the United States treated terrorism as a crime. Criminal statutes in the
United States Code define and establish punishments for terrorism. 26 Yet the events of
September 11 are evidence that the changing face of terrorism presents a new threat that
must be dealt with in a new way. The September 11 attacks were condemned as an act
of war, and the U.S. responded with extensive military action. Domestically, President
Bush issued a military order giving the Department of Defense authority to establish
military tribunals that could, at the President's discretion, try captured members of Al
Qaeda unrestrained by the procedural and evidentiary rules of the federal court system.
Congress also gave broader investigative and surveillance authority to the Justice
Department and expanded the scope of criminal liability for terrorism.
27
Unlike responses to previous acts of terrorism, the United States' response to
September 11 has taken place outside of the criminal justice system. The passage of the
USA PATRIOT Act is evidence that the leaders of our country believe that different
tools are necessary to confront acts of terrorism and future threats.
The interrogation of an alleged terrorist presents a unique situation. When law
enforcement officials wish to obtain information from a known criminal, they are able
to offer him incentives to "turn" on his fellow criminals. 28 These options are not
usually attractive to a terrorist devoted to his cause. Thus, when a terrorist refuses to
give crucial information, law enforcement authorities may not have much leverage.
1. Interrogation of a Murder Suspect: Miller v. Fenton
29
Previous cases illustrate police tactics courts are willing to accept when a murder
suspect is being interrogated. For example, in Miller, the Third Circuit allowed some
psychological manipulation when police questioned the alleged murderer of a young
girl. In that case, a seventeen-year-old girl was brutally murdered on August 13,
1973. 30 Her brothers said that she was sitting on the porch of their home when a
stranger drove up and told her that a cow was loose at the bottom of the driveway.
31
She drove her brother's car to get the cow and never returned; her body was found later
32 3that day. Miller fit the description that the victim's brothers gave to the police.33
That evening, the police questioned Miller at his place of work, and he agreed to go
25. Id. at 101.
26. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.A. § 1189 (West 1999 & Supp. 2004).
27. See Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, & War, 115 HARv. L. REV. 1217, 1223
(2002) [hereinafter Responding to Terrorism].
28. For example, police are permitted to lie to the subject in order to make him think that he has already
been given up. In addition, police can immunize a criminal or make a deal with him in exchange for
information.
29. 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986).






with them to the station house.3 4 In the interrogation room, Miller waived his Miranda
rights, and confessed to the murder one hour into the interrogation. 35 After he was
indicted for first degree murder, Miller moved to suppress his confession as involuntary,
but the Third Circuit held that Miller's confession was "elicited in a manner compatible
with the requirements of the Constitution."
36
The defendant argued that his confession was not voluntary and therefore should be
suppressed. 37 In rejecting this argument, the court closely reviewed the tape of Miller's
interrogation.38  It recognized that a "significant portion" of the interrogation was
typical, as it developed Miller's activities and whereabouts for the day in question and
sought to determine the details of the crime.39 Miller argued that the detective's method
of interrogation "constituted psychological manipulation of such magnitude" that his
confession was involuntary. 4 The detective did not threaten Miller or engage in any
physical coercion of him, but rather was sympathetic and wanted to help Miller
"unburden his mind." 4 1 The detective emphasized that Miller was not a criminal who
should be punished, but rather a sick individual who should receive help.42 He also
appealed to Miller's conscience and the importance of Miller's purging himself of the
memories that haunted him.4 3 After Miller confessed, he "collapsed in a state of shock.
He slid off his chair and onto the floor with a blank stare on his face.""
44
In determining whether or not the defendant's confession was voluntary, the court
examined the "effect that the totality of the circumstances had upon the will of the
defendant." 45 The court recognized that because Miller had previous experience with
the criminal system,46 he was aware of the consequences of confessing. It also
explained that the interrogator may manipulate the suspect's sympathies, and that the
detective's supportive, encouraging manner is a tactic aimed at winning the suspect's
trust and making him feel comfortable speaking. 47 The court stated that "the limits of
permissible questioning tactics in any case depend upon a weighing of the circumstance
of pressure against the power of resistance of the person confessing. What would be
overpowering to the weak of will or mind might be utterly ineffective against an
experienced criminal."'48 Thus, the court concluded that the detective's tactics were not
sufficiently manipulative to overbear the will of a person of Miller's characteristics, and
therefore Miller's confession was voluntary.
49
34. Id.
35. Miller, 796 F.2d at 600.
36. Id. at 601.
37. Id. at 603.
38. Id. at 603-13.
39. Id. at 601.
40. Id. at 603.
41. Miller, 796 F.2d at 602.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 602-03.
44. Id. at 602-03.
45. Id. at 604.
46. Miller was convicted of carnal abuse in 1969 and arrested for statutory rape in 1973. Id. at 600.
47. Miller, 796 F.2d. at 607.
48. Id. at 611.
49. Id. at 613.
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2. Interrogation of a Terrorist: United States v. Bin Laden
50
Miller illustrates one method of police interrogation that has been accepted by
courts. However, it is unlikely that police officers interrogating a terrorist will be able
to gain information by playing upon the terrorist's sympathies like the officers in Miller
were able to do. In the past, officers have used other tactics to interrogate terrorists
successfully. One such case arose in August 1998, after two bombs exploded outside
the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing twelve
Americans and over two hundred Kenyans and Tanzanians, and causing severe damage
to the embassy buildings and those buildings in the surrounding area.5 1 The attacks
were linked to a fundamentalist Islamic terror network financed by Osama bin Laden.
52
Indictments against fifteen named conspirators, including bin Laden, were issued, but
only four suspects were apprehended, tried, and convicted, all in the Southern District
of New York.
53
Bin Laden involved the interrogation of terrorist defendants who were charged with
participating in these bombings.54 One of the defendants, Al-'Owhali, was arrested on
August 12, 1998 and interrogated in Kenya by an FBI Special Agent and an Assistant
U.S. Attorney.55 They presented Al-'Owhali with a modified advice of rights form
("AOR") written in English.56 The AOR stated that the defendant was not required to
speak with American authorities, and if he chose to speak with them, anything he said
could be used against him in a court in the United States or elsewhere. 57 The AOR also
advised the defendant that in the United States, he would have the right to speak with a
lawyer before answering any questions and that the lawyer could be present during
questioning.58 However, since the interrogation was not taking place in the United
States, the defendant was not guaranteed that a lawyer would be appointed for him
before questioning.59 The AOR advised the defendant that he could choose not to
answer any questions at all and that he had the right to stop answering questions at any
time. The AOR was read aloud to Al-'Owhali, who could understand some spoken
English and said he understood the statement, and he signed the document. 6 1 The
defendant agreed to answer questions, and the interrogation lasted about one hour.
62
Al-'Owhali was interrogated in Kenya on several occasions between August 12 and
August 21, but he "consistently denied involvement in the embassy bombing."
63
50. 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) [hereinafter Bin Laden 2001].
51. See United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 225, 230-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) [hereinafter Bin Laden
2000].
52. Responding to Terrorism, supra note 27, at 1219-20.
53. Bin Laden 2000, 92 F. Supp. 2d. at 227-28; Benjamin Weiser, 4 Guilty in Terror Bombings of 2 U.S.
Embassies in Africa; Jury to Weigh 2 Executions, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2001, at Al.
54. Bin Laden 2001, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 172-73.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 173.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Bin Laden 2001, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 173-74.
61. Id. at 174.
62. Id. at 174.
63. Id. at 174-75.
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During the August 21 interrogation, the officers disclosed to Al-'Owhali all of the
evidence they had collected against him.64 Al-'Owhali acknowledged that the agents
"knew everything," and then promised to tell the truth about his involvement in the
embassy bombings if he could be tried in the United States.65 The next day, the officers
presented AI-'Owhali with a document of understanding ("DOU"), which was
previously approved by the United States Justice Department. 66 The DOU stated that
the defendant had been advised of his rights, including his right to remain silent and to
the presence of counsel, that the defendant understood that he was being investigated in
connection with the bombing of the United States embassy in Nairobi, and that he had
"a strong preference to have . . . [his] case tried in an United States Court because
America is . . . [his] enemy and Kenya is not," and wanted his "past and present
statements" about his involvement in the bombings "to be aired in public in an
American courtroom."'67 The DOU also stated that the defendant was "willing to waive
... [his] rights and answer the questions of American authorities upon the condition that
the undersigned law enforcement authorities make all best efforts to see that ... [he is]
brought to the United States to stand trial." 68 Al-'Owhali signed the DOU on August
22 and inculpated himself in the embassy bombing during the next four days of
interrogation.
69
On August 25, Al-'Owhali told the officers that he "possessed time-sensitive
information regarding an issue of public safety" that he would disclose in exchange for
a guarantee that he would be tried in the United States. The officers prepared a
second DOU for Al-'Owhali's signature. 71 The second DOU was similar to the first,
but it also included a more specific agreement between the defendant and the agents that
Al-'Owhali would be tried in the United States and that the information relating to
public safety could not be used as evidence in the Government's case in chief against
Al-'Owhali.72 Al-'Owhali signed the document, and on that date, he was scheduled to
be removed to the United States within the next twenty-four hours.
73
3. Is Post-September 11 Interrogation Different?
The officers interrogating the defendant in Bin Laden were able to get information
from Al-'Owhali in exchange for their guarantee that he would be tried in the United
64. Id. at 176.
65. Id. The court's opinion notes that Al-'Owhali said that he wanted to be tried in the U.S. rather than
Kenya because the U.S. was his enemy, not Kenya. See Bin Laden 2001, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 176.
66. Id. at 176.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 177.
70. Id.
71. Bin Laden 2001, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 178.
72. Id. The agreement also provided that the Government could use this particular statement against Al-
'Owhali to correct false or misleading testimony given by Al-'Owhali, if the defendant requests that the jury
be advised that he disclosed the particular information, and that if the defendant is convicted, upon his request
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States rather than Kenya.74  It took the officers fourteen days to make the
arrangements. 75 However, after the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, officers
may not have anything to offer the terrorist in exchange for his confession, nor are they
likely to have much time to bargain for information.
On September 11 terrorists hijacked two commercial airplanes and flew them into
the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. Hijacked American
Airlines Flight 11, en route from Boston to Los Angeles, crashed into the top of the
North Tower at 8:45 a.m. At 9:03 a.m., hijacked United Airlines Flight 175, also flying
from Boston to Los Angeles, crashed into the South Tower. Together the flights carried
137 passengers and twenty crew members. The South Tower collapsed at 9:50 a.m., the
North Tower collapsed at 10:29 a.m., and much of the surrounding complex was
destroyed. As a result of these terrorist attacks, 2,823 people died at the World Trade
Center. 76  The same morning, terrorists hijacked two other planes. At 9:38 a.m.,
American Airlines Flight 77, en route from Dulles to Los Angeles, turned back toward
Washington, D.C. and crashed into the Pentagon. One hundred eighty-nine people were
killed at the Pentagon, including the fifty-eight passengers and six crew members on
Flight 77. Due to the efforts of the forty-four passengers and crew members who fought
to regain control the of airplane, United Airlines Flight 93, traveling from Newark to
San Francisco, crashed in an open field in northern Pennsylvania. 77  The terrorist
activity that took place that day resulted in the deaths of 3,056 people, 78 the injuries of
countless others, and property damage totaling tens of billions of dollars.
79
The events of September 11 were condemned as an act of war, and resulted in the
United States launching the "War on Terror" in retaliation. The Bush administration
promised Americans that their nation's response would combine political, diplomatic,
financial, intelligence, and military efforts, and warned that the War on Terror would be
a long-term commitment.
8 1
Shortly after the September 11 attacks, FBI agents and Justice Department
investigators detained suspects believed to be connected with the attacks either because
they were traveling with "false passports" and were carrying "box cutters, hair dye and
$5,000 in cash" or because they had "links to al Qaeda. ' '82 In questioning the suspects,
the agents employed traditional interrogation methods and even offered them some
unusual incentives, such as "a new identity and life in the United States for them and
74. Id. at 177.
75. Id. at 179.
76. G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the Federal
Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. REV. 829, 851-52 n.53 3 (2002).
77. Id.; See also, Responding to Terrorism, supra note 27, at 1221-22.
78. Blakey, supra note 76, at 852 n.53 3.
79. See Responding to Terrorism, supra note 27, at 1221-22.
80. See President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1347, 1348 (Sept. 20,
2001), available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/-govdocs/docs/iraq/092001.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2004).
81. Id. at 1349.




their family members. ' 83 When their interrogation efforts proved unsuccessful, one
agent stated:
We are known for humanitarian treatment, so basically we are stuck .... Usually
there is some incentive, some angle to play, what you can do for them. But it could
get to that spot where we could go to pressure ... where we won't have a choice and
we are probably getting there. 84
In our post-September 11 world, law enforcement agents interrogating a terrorist
will not always have fourteen days to get the information they need, like the agents in
Bin Laden, and the good-guy approach used in Miller will rarely succeed. This Note
focuses on terrorists known to possess information regarding a threat to public safety.
These individuals are interrogated for purposes of preventing future attacks rather than,
as in Bin Laden, punishing those who engaged in a past attack. When law enforcement
officials interrogate a terrorist who is not willing to disclose information that would
allow the agents to prevent the injuries or deaths of many innocent people, there is little
they can offer the terrorist in exchange for this disclosure. Terrorists in this position are
often so committed to their cause that they will not disclose their plan of attack in
exchange for a deal. This Note argues that torture is never right or just, but when faced
with a choice between two evil alternatives, it may often be the rational path to choose.
II. WHAT iS TORTURE?
There is no clear definition of torture or description of what means of interrogation
may amount to torture. There is no definition of torture in the United States
Constitution, but Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights distinguishes between "torture" and "inhuman or degrading treatment"; however,
the meanings of both are ambiguous.
85
Torture can be either physical or psychological. Scholars disagree as to whether
there is a distinction between the two forms. Emanuel Gross states that "[w]hile
physical torture is bodily pain, deliberately and directly caused, psychological or mental
torture injures the person's soul. The form of the torture a person undergoes is
irrelevant, the assumption is that any torture will cause both physical and mental
pain. ' 86 Others disagree, and maintain that a distinction can be made between physical
and mental torture.
The majority opinion in the case of Republic of Ireland v. United Kingdom,87 in the
European Court of Human Rights, distinguishes between torture and inhumane
treatment. "Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment." 89 However, Judge Matscher believed that the
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Gross, supra note 3, at 94.
86. Id.
87. Republic of Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1978).
88. See id. at 66.
89. Id. at 67.
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distinction is not based on the degree of suffering, but on the fact that the torture is
calculated, routine and deliberate, and causes either physical or mental suffering, and
that it is for the purpose of breaking the spirit of the suspect, coercing him into doing
something, or purely for causing him pain.90 Other judges disagreed with this objective
approach. For example, Judge Zekia advanced a belief that a subjective test must be
used in addition to an objective test to determine whether certain conduct in a certain
situation amounts to torture.9 1 Such a subjective test should include factors such as the
nature of the inhumane treatment, the age, sex, and state of health of the person
undergoing treatment, and the likelihood that the treatment will cause psychological,
mental, or physical pain to that person.92
Although there is no clearly accepted definition of torture, it is safe to say that
some circumstances will always be considered torture from an objective point of view.
Labeling certain conduct as "torture" carries with it a negative moral connotation.
Every infliction of pain is not torture; it may be a permitted infliction of pain, a
prohibited infliction of pain, or it may rise to the level of torture. These categories
could be delineated based on several different criteria, such as the intensity of suffering,
the severity of injury, the intent of the inflictor, the degree to which the treatment
violates the dignity of the suspect, as well as the subjective criteria laid out by Judge
Zekia.
Despite these unclear definitions, the purpose of the torturous conduct forms the
basis for accepted distinctions between different types of torture. Torture finds its
justification in four purposes: (1) interrogation, (2) instilling fear, (3) punishment, and
(4) prevention. 93 Interrogational torture is "the infliction of severe physical or mental
pain during the course of the interrogation, with the purpose of extracting certain
information from the suspect, and not for the purpose of deterrence or instilling fear
alone." 94 Torture of terrorists can be aimed either at instilling fear alone or instilling
fear to effectuate deterrence and prevention of terrorist activities. Although there is a
consensus that torture for the purposes of punishment is prohibited,95 torture during
interrogation could theoretically lead to prevention of terrorist attacks.
90. Id. at 139. The judge went on to say that modem interrogation practices often amount to torture,
while brutality may not fall within the definition of torture:
The modem methods of torture which in their outward aspects differ markedly from the primitive,
brutal methods employed in former times are well known. In this sense torture is in no way a
higher degree of inhuman treatment. On the contrary, one can envisage forms of brutality which
cause much more acute bodily suffering but are not necessarily on that account comprised within
the notion of torture.
Id.
91. Id. at 97
92. Republic ofIreland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 97. The judge explained the need for a subjective analysis:
As an example I can refer to the case of an elderly sick man who is exposed to a harsh treatment-
after being given several blows and beaten to the floor, he is dragged and kicked on the floor for
several hours. I would say without hesitation that the poor man has been tortured. If such
treatment is applied [to] a wrestler or even a young athlete, I would hesitate a lot to describe it as
an inhuman treatment and I might regard it as a mere rough handling.
Id.





III. OUR STANCE: "TORTURE ANYWHERE IS AN AFFRONT TO HUMAN DIGNITY
EVERYWHERE"
9 6
On June 26, 2003, the United Nations' appointed day to recognize torture victims,
President Bush declared, "[tihe United States is committed to the world-wide
elimination of torture and we are leading this fight by example." 97 President Bush's
proclamation states that the United States, along with more than 130 other countries,
has ratified The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment ("CAT"),98 which forbids governments from "deliberately inflicting severe
physical or mental pain or suffering on those within their custody or control."
99
One day earlier, William Haynes, General Counsel to the Department of Defense,
sent a letter spelling out these commitments to Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy. 
° °
Senator Leahy had written to Condoleeza Rice, President Bush's National Security
Advisor, with several questions about American policy after the issuance of news
reports in which anonymous American officials claimed that terrorist suspects were
subjected to "stress-and-duress" interrogations, 0 1 were tortured outright, or were turned
over to countries known to use torture.
10 2
Haynes' letter to Senator Leahy further explains the obligations of the United
States under the Convention. The United States' legal obligations include conducting
interrogations in a manner that is consistent with the CAT as ratified by the U.S. in
1994 and in compliance with the federal anti-torture statute 1° 3 which Congress enacted
to fulfill U.S. obligations under the CAT. Haynes states that "[t]he United States does
not permit, tolerate or condone any such torture by its employees under any
circumstances." 
104
Under Article 16 of the CAT, the United States has an obligation to "undertake... to
prevent other acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment which do
not amount to torture." 10 5 The terms in Article 16 are not defined, but the United States
ratified the CAT with a reservation to this provision, which supplies a definition for the
96. President George W. Bush, Statement by the President at the United Nations International Day in
Support of Victims of Torture (June 26, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030626-3.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2004) [hereinafter
Statement by the President].
97. Id.
98. United National Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39"h Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984)
[hereinafter CAT].
99. Statement by the President, supra note 96.
100. Letter from William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, to Senator Patrick
Leahy (June 25, 2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/06/letter-to-leahy.pdf (last visited Nov.
19, 2004) [hereinafter Letter from Haynes].
101. Examples of "stress and duress" techniques include depriving prisoners of sleep and keeping them in
awkward positions until they feel pain. Peter Slevin, U.S. Pledges to Avoid Torture, WASH. POST, June 27,
2003, at A11.
102. Letter from Senator Patrick Leahy to Dr. Condoleeza Rice, National Security Advisor (June 2, 2004),
available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/06/letter-to-rice.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2004).
103. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2340-2340A (West 2001).
104. Letter from Haynes, supra note 100.
105. Id., see also CAT, supra note 98.
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term "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment."' 106  The reservation
provides that "the United States considers itself bound by the obligation under [A]rticle
16 to prevent 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' only in so far as
the term... means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited
by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States."1
07
In addition, under "Article 3 of the CAT, the United States does not 'expel, return
... or extradite' individuals to other countries where the U.S. believes it is 'more likely
than not' that they will be tortured. ' 1° 8 In situations where it is necessary to transfer an
individual to another country to be held on behalf of the United States, Haynes specifies
that U.S. policy is to "obtain specific assurances from the receiving country that it will
not torture the individual."
' 10 9
President Bush's statement does not explain the qualifications the United States
placed on its obligations under CAT before ratification. Rather, his statement focuses
on victims of torture as innocent individuals who are tortured by their own
governments. 110 In his statement, Bush does not consider the situation of a terrorist
interrogation. Bush states that, despite the ratification of the CAT by over 130
countries, "torture continues to be practiced around the world by rogue regimes whose
cruel methods match their determination to crush the human spirit. Beating, burning,
rape, and electric shock are some of the grisly tools such regimes use to terrorize their
own citizens. ' '111 He cites "stories told by torture survivors, who are recounting a vast
array of sadistic acts perpetrated against the innocent" as evidence that torture still
occurs.112 He ends the proclamation with a statement that calls for all governments to
treat their citizens with dignity: "No people, no matter where they reside, should have
to live in fear of their own government. Nowhere should the midnight knock
foreshadow a nightmare of state-commissioned crime. The suffering of torture victims
must end, and the United States calls on all governments to assume this great
mission."
113
The United States' obligations under the CAT forbid the use of torture or other
degrading treatment in any circumstance, insofar as such conduct violates the Fifth,
114
Eighth, 115 or Fourteenth Amendment 116 of the Constitution. Thus, the United States
government pledged to the world that it does not and will not use torture.








114. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
115. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
116. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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IV. PERSPECTIVES ON TORTURE
A. Human Rights Laws: An Absolute Prohibition of Torture
The United Nations CAT establishes an absolute ban on torture, which it defines
as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person
information or a confession ... when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 117
Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights explicitly
states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment,""11 8 and Article 4.2 of the Covenant also states that "[n]o
derogation" from Article 7 is permitted. 119 Article 4.2 explicitly refers to Article 4.1,
which allows states who are parties to the Covenant, during a "time of public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially
proclaimed," to "take measures derogating from their obligations under the present
Covenant." 120 However, this does not include torture or "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment."'
12 1
Most recently, a set of "Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe on Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism" were adopted on July 11,
2002.122 They include a reaffirmation of the absolute prohibition on torture "in all
circumstances, and in particular during the arrest, questioning and detention of a person
suspected of ... terrorist activities, irrespective of the nature of the acts that the person
is suspected of....",123 Guideline XV, titled "Possible derogations," specifically states
that "[s]tates may never, however, and whatever the acts of the person suspected of
terrorist activities ... derogate from the ... prohibition against torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment .... "
124
These various laws and treaties make clear the absolute prohibition of torture.
They establish an "Ulyssean contract to be honored whatever the lure of the Sirens"
125
117. CAT, supra note 98.
118. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 4, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 172.
119. Id. at art. 7.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism adopted by the Committee of
Ministers, Council of Europe, 804th mtg., H(2002)0004 art. IV, XV, (July 11, 2002), available at
http://www.legislationline.org/view.php?document=57199&ref-true (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Sanford Levinson, "Precommitument" and "Postcommittment": The Ban on Torture in the Wake of
September 11, 81 TEX. L. REv. 2013, 2017 (2003).
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and appear to leave no room for justification or exception. In practice, however, a
number of countries that are parties to the Torture Convention have been accused of
committing torture or engaging in cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Oona
Hathaway's empirical study of countries that have ratified anti-torture conventions and
those that have not shows that "the differences in average level of human rights ratings
for ratifiers versus nonratifiers are small." 126 Her studies of regional (as opposed to
United Nations) treaties outlawing torture show that "[t]he countries that have ratified
the treaties appear to have worse torture practices than the countries that are members of
the sponsoring regional organization but have not ratified the treaties ... ,,127
B. The Case of the Ticking Bomb Terrorist: The Dershowitz Position
Jeremy Bentham constructed a hypothetical case to support his utilitarian argument
against an absolute prohibition of torture:
Suppose an occasion were to arise, in which a suspicion is entertained, as strong as
that which would be received as a sufficient ground for arrest and commitment as for
felony-a suspicion that at this very time a considerable number of individuals are
actually suffering, by illegal violence inflictions equal in intensity to those which if
inflicted by the hand of justice, would universally be spoken of under the name of
torture. For the purpose of rescuing from torture these hundred innocents, should any
scruple be made of applying equal or superior torture, to extract the requisite
information from the mouth of one criminal, who having it in his power to make
known the place where at this time the enormity was practising (sic) or about to be
pracitsed (sic), should refuse to do so? To say nothing of wisdom, could any pretence
be made so much as to the praise of blind and vulgar humanity, by the man who to
save one criminal, should determine to abandon 100 innocent persons to the same
fate?128
Bentham's hypothetical illustrates his argument that the torture of one guilty person
should be justified to prevent the torture of one hundred innocent people. Under this
rationale, it would seem to follow that torture would also be justified to prevent the
murder of thousands of innocent civilians in what's been called the "ticking bomb"
case. Consider the hypothetical often presented by Harvard law professor Alan
Dershowitz: A terrorist knows the location of a bomb that is about to go off and destroy
a large city, but the terrorist is not willing to disclose the information. 129  In this
situation, Dershowitz suggests, the argument for torturing the terrorist is strongest.
Dershowitz suggests that if non-lethal torture is permissible in the ticking bomb
case, advance judicial approval, in the form of a "torture warrant," should be
126. Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, It1 YALE L.J. 1935, 1978
(2002).
127. Id. at 1979.
128. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO
THE CHALLENGE 142-43 (2002) (quoting Jeremy Bentham).
129. Id. at 140.
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required. 13  He proposes that the requirement that a torture warrant be granted by a
judge reviewing the allegations of necessity proffered by the would-be torturers would
reduce the use of torture and create a system of public accountability for its use.131
Dershowitz argues that a requirement of judicial approval would result in fewer
instances of torture, even if a judge rarely turns down a request. 132 In addition, it is
likely that law enforcement officials would only seek a warrant in circumstances where
they had compelling evidence that the suspect had information needed to prevent an
imminent terrorist attack, and there was no alternative way to discover the information.
It is also reasonable to assume that most judges would require compelling evidence in
order to grant a torture warrant.
133
Dershowitz argues that this warrant requirement would also serve to protect the
rights of the suspect. "He would be granted immunity, told that he was now compelled
to testify, threatened with imprisonment if he refused to do so, and given the option of
providing the requested information." 134  If the suspect refused to provide the
information after being immunized, he would then be threatened with torture.
Dershowitz argues that the suspect might be more willing to provide the information if
he knows that the use of torture has been authorized by law.
135
There are two problems with Professor Dershowitz's theory. First, the torture
warrant requirement is impractical. In the ticking bomb situation, there is no time for
law enforcement officials to present evidence to a judge in order to obtain a warrant. In
addition, many judges may not be comfortable publicly declaring themselves an
accessory to torture. 136 Thus, it will be difficult to find judges that are willing to issue
torture warrants. Some judges may choose not to be part of the process on personal
moral grounds, while others may refuse to face public accountability for such conduct.
Second, the effects of the United States publicly endorsing torture would be
catastrophic. The civilized world has considered torture illegitimate for over a century.
Legitimization of torture by the United States, even reserved for extraordinary
situations, would subject the world to an incredible setback in the campaign for human
rights and would provide justification for the use of torture across the world. One of
Orwell's final comments in 1984 is appropriate: "If you want a picture of the future,
imagine a boot stamping on a human face-for ever."'
137
Two Bentham scholars, W. L. Twining and P. E. Twining, have argued that torture
is impermissible, even when restricted to a limited situation. 138 They argue that there
should be a distinction between justifying an isolated act of torture in an extreme
emergency (like the ticking bomb scenario) and justifying the institutionalization of
130. Id. at 159.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See generally id
134. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 128, at 159.
135. Id.
136. Justice Scalia has argued that no judge who is morally opposed to the death penalty should preside
over capital punishment cases because the judge's role in the case makes him sufficiently complicit in the act
of capital punishment. Antonin Scalia, God's Justice and Ours, 132 FIRST THINGS 17, 17 (May 2002)
available at http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0205/articles/scalia.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
137. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 at 220 (Penguin Group 1981) (1949).
138. See generally W.L. Twining & P.E. Twining, Bentham on Torture, 24 N. IR. L. Q. 305 (1973).
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torture as a regular practice (even if in limited circumstances), because "no government
in the world" can be trusted not to abuse this power:
[For] the circumstances are so extreme in which most of us would be prepared to
justify resort to torture, if at all, the conditions we would impose would be so
stringent, the practical problems of devising and enforcing adequate safeguards so
difficult and the risks of abuse so great that it would be unwise and dangerous to
139
entrust any government, however enlightened, with such a power.
C. The Israeli Experience
Although scholars such as W.L. Twining and P.E. Twining would disapprove,
some countries have advocated the use of torture in appropriate circumstances. In 1987,
a commission chaired by Moshe Landau, former President of the Supreme Court of
Israel, examined the interrogation techniques of Israel's General Security Service
(GSS). The Landau Commission concluded that Israel's codified version of the
necessity defense authorizes in advance the use of force in interrogation if the
interrogator reasonably believes the use of force is "necessary to get information that
would prevent the greater evil of loss of innocent lives." 140 The Commission's report
established the bureaucratic framework for torture in Israel. According to the Supreme
Court of Israel:
The decision to utilize physical means in a particular instance is based on internal
regulations, which requires obtaining permission from various ranks of the GSS
hierarchy. The regulations themselves were approved by a special Ministerial
Committee on GSS interrogations. Among other guidelines, the Committee set forth
directives pertaining to the rank authorized to allow these interrogation practices....
Different interrogation methods are employed depending on the suspect, both in
relation to what is required in that situation and to the likelihood of obtaining
authorization. The GSS does not resort to every interrogation method at its disposal
in each case.
141
However, the GSS did not always adhere to the guidelines put in place, and there is
some evidence that the GSS tortured as many as eighty-five percent of detained
Palestinians. Between 1987 and 1994, between sixteen and twenty-five Palestinians
died during or shortly after interrogation. 14 2 Yet, there is also evidence that the GSS's
interrogations served to thwart some terrorist attacks. 1
43
139. Id. at 348-49.
140. John T. Parry & Welsh S. White, Interrogating Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture Be an Option?,
63 U. PITT. L. REV. 743, 757 (2002).
141. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel (Sept. 6, 1999), 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1474
(1999).




In 1996, the Israel Supreme Court issued an order to prevent the use of force in a
particular interrogation, but lifted it the next day after the GSS claimed that it was
interrogating the suspect to obtain information that could prevent future terrorist
attacks. 144 The suspect's attorney said that "the court's decision reflected its usual
practice of 'grant[ing] injunctions only when the state made no objection, and
allow[ing] the use of physical pressures when the state made no objection, and
allow[ing] the use of physical pressures when the state sought it."' 14 5 This decision led
to a United Nations investigation of Israel's use of force in interrogations. The Israel
Supreme Court soon began hearings in a case brought by six individual Palestinians and
two Israeli human rights organizations. In 1999, the court issued its decision in Public
Committee Against Torture in Israel v. The State of Israel. 146 The court's ruling made
clear that any form of interrogation must be measured against a strong presumption of
individual liberty:
An interrogation inevitably infringes upon the suspect's freedom, even if physical
means are not used. Indeed, undergoing an interrogation infringes on both the
suspect's dignity and his individual privacy. In a state adhering to the Rule of Law,
interrogations are therefore not permitted in [the] absence of clear statutory
authorization.... 147
The court found that the coercive practices at issue were each prohibited, and the
court rejected the government's claim that torture is authorized in advance by the
necessity defense because it leads to information that saves lives. 148 The court banned
torture, but also stated its willingness "to accept that in the appropriate circumstances,
GSS investigators may avail themselves of the 'necessity' defense, if criminally
indicted." 149  Although the Israeli Court held that the necessity defense does not
authorize torture, it did recognize that the defense may be raised in the rare situation in
which the use of force in an interrogation may be necessary.
V. LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Case Law
In our own country, if law enforcement officials were to engage in conduct that
amounts to torture, presumably they could be subjected to criminal liability. Federal
courts have decided several cases that, while they do not deal with interrogation of
terrorists for the prevention of an attack, may have some bearing on how a court might
deal with an interrogator on trial for torture.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit seems to have
144. Id. at 758-59.
145. Id. at 759.
146. 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999).
147. Id. at 1478.
148. Id. at 1489.
149. Id. at 1486.
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approved torture as a way of obtaining information necessary to find a victim of
kidnapping in the case Leon v. Wainwright. 15  In Wainwright, the Miami police choked
a suspect "until he revealed where [the victim] was being held." 151 A dissenting state
court judge described the policemen's conduct as "'rack and pinion' techniques,"'152 but
the federal appellate court unanimously held that it was merely "a group of concerned
officers acting in a reasonable manner to obtain information they needed in order to
protect another individual from bodily harm or death."'
153
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and
unusual punishment, including torture. 154 The Supreme Court has consistently held that
"wanton infliction of physical pain" is outside the scope of legitimate punishment,
regardless of the crime.155 Professor Dershowitz, citing Ingraham v. Wright,156 argues
that this prohibition applies only to punishment, and that the effort to obtain information
in a situation where no judicially imposed punishment is intended falls outside of the
prohibition. 157  The plaintiffs in Ingraham challenged the imposition of corporal
punishment, referred to as "paddling" on students in the public schools in Florida.
158
The "paddling" included assaults of twenty to fifty blows with a wooden slat, and
sometimes left the recipients incapacitated and in need of medical treatment. 159 A five-
member majority found the punishments in question to be outside the scope of the
Eighth Amendment and construed the ban on "cruel and unusual punishment" to apply
only to punishment imposed as part of the criminal process.
160
Dershowitz also claims that the protection against self-incrimination bars the use of
coerced disclosures at trial, but does not bar the coercion itself.16 1  In Chavez v.
Martinez,162 the plaintiff sought damages based on a violation of his right against self-
incrimination because he was interrogated for over a forty-five minutes while in pain
150. Leon v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 770 (11 th Cir. 1984).
151. Id. at 771.
152. Leon v. State, 410 So. 2d 201, 206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). (Ferguson, J., dissenting). An excerpt
from the state judge's dissent:
For the first time in history, and the majority concedes as much, there is articulated a distinction
between violent police conduct, the purpose of which is to gain information which might save a
life, and such conduct employed for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used in a court of law.
The majority holds that where the illegal conduct is motivated by the first consideration no
coercive taint will attach so as to render inadmissible evidence subsequently obtained for the
purpose of securing a conviction. In essence, evidence of the whereabouts of a victim may be
obtained using 'rack and pinion' techniques if the officer on the scene determines the situation life-
threatening, and after the information sought has been extracted the status is 'deemed' as if the
illegality had never occurred-an eerie proposition which should be rejected outright for all too
obvious reasons.
Id.
153. Wainwright, 734 F.2d at 773 (1 th Cir. 1984).
154. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
155. Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the
War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278, 283-84 (2003).
156. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
157. Kreimer, supra note 155, at 284.
158. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 656-57.
159. Id. One of the plaintiffs received more than twenty blows, required medical care, and could not
return to school for several days. A second plaintiff could not use one of his arms for a week. See id.
160. Id. at 688-89.
161. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 128, at 135.
162. 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
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and waiting to undergo medical treatment after being shot in the face by the police.1
63
Justice Thomas' opinion holds that there was no violation of the right against self-
incrimination because the plaintiff was never brought to trial on any criminal charge. 164
The opinion asserts that "[s]tatements compelled by police interrogations of course may
not be used against a defendant at trial, but it is not until their use in a criminal case that
a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs,"' 165 and that "the absence of a
'criminal case' in which Martinez was compelled to be a 'witness' against himself
defeats his core Fifth Amendment claim."' 166 However, the Court does renounce the
argument that torture to obtain relevant information is a constitutionally acceptable law
enforcement technique if the information is not introduced at trial: "Our views on the
proper scope of the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause do not mean that
police torture or other abuse that results in a confession is constitutionally permissible
so long as the statements are not used at trial .... 167
The Supreme Court, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 168 has also recognized that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "was intended to prevent
government . . . 'from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of
oppression." '"169 In Lewis, the Court rejected a plaintiff's contention that a police
officer's deliberate indifference during a high-speed chase that caused the death of a
motorcyclist violated due process. 170 However, the Court left open the possibility that
unauthorized police conduct in other contexts may "shock the conscience" and give rise
to liability. 17 1 In Lewis, the Court noted that conduct "most likely to rise to the
conscience-shocking level" is "conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by
any government interest."' 172 The Fourth Amendment 173 has been held to bar law
enforcement officials from either employing excessive force in carrying out arrests even
with probable cause 174 or engaging in brutally invasive searches for evidence even with
a warrant. 175
As a general protection, the Court has held that due process substantively protects
against physical abuses that "shock the conscience" of the Court, even when not
covered by a specific constitutional constraint. For instance, in Rochin v. California,
176
defendant Rochin swallowed two pills that were sitting on a table beside the bed when
the police burst into his apartment. 177 The police took him to a hospital where a doctor
was directed by one of the officers to induce vomiting by "forc[ing] an emetic solution
163. Id. at 764.
164. Id. at 767.
165. Id. (citations omitted).
166. Id. at 772-73.
167. Id.
168. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
169. Id. at 846 (citations omitted).
170. Id. at 854.
171. Id. at 850.
172. Id. at 849.
173. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
174. See Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
175. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985).
176. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
177. Id. at 166.
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through a tube into Rochin's stomach against his will."' 17 8 Rochin vomited, and the
capsules as well as the morphine they contained were admitted against Rochin at his
trial. 179 The Court held that due process requires respect of "certain decencies of
civilized conduct." 180 The Court described the conduct of the police as "too close to the
rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation."' 18 1 The shock to the
Court's conscience came from the coercion, violence and brutality to the person
involved. 182
It is unclear whether the Court will apply any of these precedents in the context of a
terrorism-related case. The Court may try to adapt some of these standards and apply
them in the context of terrorism, or it may choose to develop entirely new standards,
whether they be objective, subjective, or both. Although it is difficult to predict if the
Court would apply these precedents in the context of terrorism, they provide a helpful
context for the situation.
These cases are distinguishable from the case of the ticking bomb terrorist because
in the ticking bomb situation, agents are interrogating the terrorist in order to prevent an
attack rather than to investigate the attack. The objective of the interrogation is not law
enforcement but public safety, and the Court is likely to take this goal into account
when deciding what rule to apply. Thus, the terrorist is not yet involved in a criminal
case, and the judicial adversary process has not yet begun. Therefore, the suspect does
not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 183 Under Chavez, a suspect's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination does not attach until his statements are used
against him in a criminal case. 184 Although the Court explicitly rejects torture as a
permissible law enforcement technique, 185 it may adopt a different standard in a
situation where torture is employed to prevent an immediate and large-scale threat to
public safety. For instance, the Court might choose to apply Lewis in conjunction with
Chavez. The Court noted in Lewis that conduct that is likely to "shock the conscience"
of the Court is "conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government
interest."186 In applying this standard, the Court may conclude that the public safety
interest of preventing the injury and death of many innocent people justifies the
treatment of the terrorist.
B. Necessity Defense
No one could possibly justify sacrificing millions of lives to spare a murderous
psychopath a brief spell of intense pain, which he can end by his own choice. When
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. Id. at 173.
181. Id.
182. Roche, 342 U.S. at 173-74.
183. See Massiah v. United States., 377 U.S. 201, 204-05 (1964).
184. See Chavez, 538 U.S at 767.
185. See id. at 773.
186. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (emphasis added).
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the threat is so gigantic and the solution so simple, we are all in the camp of the
S,187
Shakespeare character who said, 'There is no virtue like necessity.
The necessity defense was created for the situation in which a person commits an
offense for which, from a social and moral point of view, it is undesirable to impose
criminal liability on him. 188 It is applicable when a situation is forced on a person and
in order to prevent a real danger, his only option is to impair the protected interests of
another. 
189
Utilitarianism permits performing a lesser wrong in order to prevent a greater
wrong. However, there are moral problems with this argument. "And not rather (as we
be slanderously reported, and as some affirm that we say,) Let us do evil, that good may
come? Whose damnation is just." 9 0 This passage of the Bible teaches that it is wrong
to commit a sin to glorify God. More broadly, it argues that good ends never justify
evil means, and one should not cause effects that are evil even if they are a necessary
means to a greater good. Under a strict view of this moral philosophy, it is not
permissible to torture a terrorist in order to save innocent lives. While courts have not
considered the use of the necessity defense in this context, they have considered its
application in homicide cases.
The 1884 case Regina v. Dudley & Stephens191 rejects the necessity defense in a.. 192
homicide prosecution. Three adult seamen and seventeen year-old Richard Parker
were forced to survive on an open boat after their ship sank. 193 After twenty days on
the boat, the last nine days of which were without food and the last seven of which were
without water, the sailors were very weak, and Parker was ill. 194 Dudley and Stephens
killed Parker in order to eat his flesh and survive. 195 The third sailor did not approve of,
or participate in, the homicide.
196  Four days later, the three men were rescued.
197
Dudley and Stephens were prosecuted for Parker's murder, and they raised the defense
of necessity. 198 The Court rejected the necessity defense and found them guilty of
murder. 199  In so doing, they cited Lord Hale's argument that the only justified
necessity is self-defense. 200 Hale argued that if a starving man steals food in order to
187. This quote from Steve Chapman of the Washington Times was quoted in DERSHOWITZ, supra note
128, at 105. The last line was taken from Shakespeare's TRAGEDY OF KING RICHARD 11. The statement made
by John of Gaunt, who was both a historical figure (Duke of Lancaster) and the character of King Richard's
uncle in the play, was "[t]each thy necessity to reason thus[:] There is no virtue like necessity." Id. act I, sc.
iii.
188. See Gross, supra note 3, at 107.
189. See id.
190. Romans 3:8 (King James).
191. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
192. See id. at 287-88.
193. Id at 273.
194. Id. at 274.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. at 274.
198. Id. at 288.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 282.
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eat, he has committed a felony which is punishable by death under English law.
20 1
Under Hale's logic that hunger does not justify theft, it follows that hunger does not
justify murder.
One could argue that the court in Dudley & Stephens did not, or did not have to,
categorically reject the defense of necessity in homicide cases. At the time that Dudley
and Stephens acted, the harm they were seeking to avoid was not yet imminent. Lord
Coleridge focused on the special finding of the jury that it was "probable" that the three
seamen would have died had they not killed Parker.202 Thus, Dudley and Stephens
deprived Parker of his life on the chance that this might preserve their own lives. 203 If
their situation had been more extreme, their defense may have received more favorable
treatment. In addition, Parker was unoffending and innocent. Under Hale's self-
defense rationale, the killing of a victim who may be categorized as an aggressor might
be more defensible.
The use of torture during the interrogation of a terrorist in order to gain information
that will save innocent lives is distinguishable from the situation evaluated in Dudley &
Stephens. First, the interrogation of a terrorist does not involve committing a homicide
to save the lives of others. The terrorist will not be killed, but rather subjected to
varying degrees of discomfort in order to persuade him to give law enforcement
officials the information they need in order to prevent the deaths of many innocent
people. Second, Hale's rationale for self defense applies to this case. The terrorist has
taken some action that will soon cause the deaths of innocent people. He is not
unoffending; his role in the situation makes him an aggressor. In addition, the terrorist
has the power to end the interrogation by giving the law enforcement officials the
information they are seeking.
The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code recognizes a "Choice of Evils"
defense.204 Under this defense, the conduct of a person acting to avoid a harm or evil to
himself or another is justifiable if:
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought
to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and (b) neither the Code nor
other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the
specific situation involved; and (c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification
claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
205
The Comment to section 3.02 of the Code explains that necessity is a justification
for conduct that would otherwise constitute an offense, and that the legal system must
look beyond the letter of specific prohibitions and consider the situation. 206  The
Comment recognizes that "the sanctity of life has a supreme place in the hierarchy of
values, [and] it is nonetheless true that conduct that results in taking life may promote
201. Id. at 283.
202. Id. at 279.
203. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. at 279.
204. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
205. Id. § 3.02(1).
206. Id. at cmt. n. 1.
2004]
Journal of Legislation
the very value sought to be protected by the law of homicide." 20 7 For example, if an
actor who floods a farm to save a whole town is indicted for the homicide of the
residents of the farm house, he can argue that the objective of the law prohibiting
homicide is to save life and that his conduct, while killing a few people, saved many
innocent lives. The Comment acknowledges that there are ethical and moral problems
with taking one innocent life to prevent many innocent deaths. However, when an actor
is faced with inflicting one death to save many lives, if the choice among lives to be
saved is not unfair, the actor should be allowed that choice. Thus, the Model Penal
Code's Choice of Evils justification is applicable to homicides.
Under the framework and rationale of the Model Penal Code, an interrogator who
is subject to criminal liability for the torture of a terrorist in a ticking bomb situation
should be able to raise the necessity defense. The interrogator engaging in torture
certainly believes that the terrorist has knowledge that could help the law enforcement
official prevent many deaths. The injury, suffering, and death of many innocent people
is a greater harm or evil than the suffering of one terrorist who has already engaged in
wrongdoing, who can control when the torturous treatment ends by telling the
interrogator the information he knows. The Comment to § 3.02 of the Code states that
"[a] developed legal system must have better ways of dealing with such problems than
to refer only to the letter of particular prohibitions, framed without reference to
cases...."
20 8
The Landau Report, which concluded that Israel's necessity defense authorized the
use of force if the interrogator reasonably believed that force was necessary, stated that
there was no need to require imminence for the defense to apply. 209 However, the
element of imminence that is present in the ticking bomb scenario is crucial. When the
danger is not imminent, an interrogator is not truly faced with a choice between two
evils. For instance, an interrogator who knows that a bomb will be planted in a city
building in one month and set to go off three days later is not justified in torturing a
terrorist in custody today to find out where the bomb will be planted. In this situation,
law enforcement officials know that danger is pending, but it is not imminent. There
are many measures that they can take over the next month to try to prevent the attack.
For instance, they can increase security in all city buildings as well as continue to
question the terrorist in custody. The threat becomes imminent once the bomb is
planted and set to go off and there is no longer enough time to evacuate. At this point,
the only option is to find and disarm the bomb, and if the terrorist in custody is not
willing to disclose the location of the bomb, the law enforcement official may be
justified in resorting to torture techniques during the interrogation. Thus, the element of
imminence must be present in order to limit the situations in which law enforcement
officers resort to torture.
With a requirement of imminent danger, an interrogator may be able to claim the
necessity defense regardless of whether the bomb was set to go off in one hour or in one
day. As long as the interrogator does not know how much time he has to find the bomb,
in his mind the danger could materialize any minute. Thus, when an interrogator has
207. Id. at crnt. n.3.
208. Id. at cmt. n. 1.
209. See Gross, supra note 3, at 107.
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compelling evidence that the suspect in custody did plant the bomb, that the bomb is set
to go off, and that the interrogator will not be able to find and disarm the bomb before it
goes off unless the suspect discloses where the bomb is located, the danger is imminent.
CONCLUSION: WHERE Do WE DRAW THE LINE?
The way to win this war is not to adopt our enemies' evil methods. Resort to torture
could conceivably stave off a catastrophe. But at what price to our self respect? ...
We are in a war of the decent against the indecent. We dare not cross the line that
separates the two.
2 10
Torture is wrong: it is immoral and abhorrent, and it is never right or just. Despite
the threat that terrorism poses, we must not lose sight of the right of all humans to be
treated with dignity. In fact, at the core of the War on Terror we are fighting for this
right of dignity. The United States must not endorse torture, as this action would only
serve to provide justification for the rest of the world to engage in such practices.
However, the possibility exists that our law enforcement officials will be faced with a
decision between two evils: subjecting a terrorist to some degree of torture, or allowing
a large number of innocent people to die. In a true ticking bomb scenario, interrogators
may employ physical or psychological means to elicit information from the suspect.
Torture in this scenario is not right or just, but it is the lesser of the two evils. If the
officer is subjected to criminal prosecution for his conduct, he should be able to raise
the necessity defense. The judge or jury would evaluate the officer's claim that he
believed some degree of torture was immediately necessary to avoid a greater harm, and
thus he may be relieved of criminal liability for his actions. This approach allows the
use of torture in the situation in which it is absolutely necessary, but allows the
government to maintain the principle that torture is prohibited. This will deter the
government from using torture in unnecessary situations or for reasons other than the
elicitation of information, and prevent our country from degrading itself by engaging in
conduct that is inconsistent with fundamental notions of democracy and human
decency.
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